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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Restraint of Trade-Applicability of
Section 7 of Clayton Act to Bank Mergers
Two Philadelphia banks' sought to consolidate2 under the Bank
Merger Act of 1960.3 The resultant bank would have been the largest
in the Philadelphia metropolitan area4 and would have had approxi-
mately thirty-six per cent of the area's total bank deposits, thirty-six
per cent of the assets, and thirty-four per cent of the net loans. The
Bank Merger Act authorizes such a merger subject to the approval of
the Comptroller of Currency, who must obtain reports from the other
two banking agencies and the Attorney General respecting the proba-
ble effects on competition of the proposed transaction. Although these
reports stated that the consolidation would have anticompetitive ef-
fects, the Comptroller approved the merger.5 The day after the merger
was approved, the Justice Department brought an action in the federal
district court charging violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Act.7 The district court held8 that section 7
1. The Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard Trust Exchange Bank, a state
bank member of the Federal Reserve System insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, are respectively the second and third largest of 42 commercial banks in
the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
3. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963).
the creation of a new corporation and the termination of the constituent ones, whereas
a merger signifies the absorption of one corporation by another, which retains its name
and corporate identity with the added capital, franchises and powers of a merged
corporation." 15 FLETCErc , CORPORATIONS § 7041, at 6 (Perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961).
By the terms of the proposed agreement, the consolidation would take place under the
Philadelphia National Bank's charter, the stockholders of which were to retain their
share certificates, while Girard's stockholders would surrender their shares in exchange
for shares in the consolidated bank. This combination is technically a consolidation;
however, since the applicable statutes and the Court make no distinction between a
merger and a consolidation, the term merger will be used throughout this discussion.
3. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended, U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963).
4. This consists of the City of Philadelphia and three contiguous Pennsylvania
counties.
5. No opinion was rendered at the time of the approval; however, the Comptroller
explained the basis of his decision to approve the merger in his annual report to
Congress. In his opinion, there was an adequate number of alternative sources of
banking service in Philadelphia and in view of the beneficial effects of the increased
national and international competition, the overall effect upon competition would not
be unfavorable. In addition, the consolidated bank would be better able to serve the
needs of the community and assist the city and state in attracting new capital and
retaining industry. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 333 (1963).
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
7. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
8. 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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of the Clayton Act is not applicable to bank mergers; that even if sec-
tion 7 is applicable, the Philadelphia metropolitan area is not the
relevant geographical market area; that even if the Philadelphia
metropolitan area is the relevant market, there is no reasonable proba-
bility that competition among commercial banks in the area will be
substantially lessened as a result of the Act; thus the merger does not
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act; a fortiori, it does not violate sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act. On appeal9 to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, reversed. Section 7 of the Clayton Act is ap-
plicable to bank mergers; the proposed merger would have serious
anticompetitive effects and must be enjoined. United States v. Phila-
delphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Monopoly market power resulting from the consolidation of com-
peting units was proscribed by the Sherman Act.10 However, the
Sherman Act could not attack such monopoly power until the power
was exercised; therefore, antitrust policy often faced the task of dis-
membering huge corporations." To provide authority to limit such
concentrations before it reached monopoly proportions, Congress
adopted the Clayton Act in 1914.12 Original section 7 of the Clayton
Act expressed the so-called incipiency doctrine and prohibited achieve-
ment of full monopoly power by limiting the acquisition by one corpo-
ration of the stock of another when such acquisition would result in
a substantial lessening of competition between the acquiring and the
acquired corporation, or when such acquisition would tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. This section was not effective, by
its explicit terms, or as construed by the Supreme Court, to bar the
acquisition by one corporation of the assets of another.' 3 Although at
the time of the passage of the Clayton Act the possibility of asset ac-
quisitions was discussed, it was not thought to be an important consi-
deration with respect to an act then directed primarily against the
development of holding companies and the secret acquisition of com-
petitors through the purchase of all or part of such competitors' stock. 14
Most mergers were held beyond the reach of the Clayton Act.15 Even
a stock acquisition was beyond attack if converted to an asset acquisi-
tion anytime before the issuance of the government's divestment
9. Appeal was brought under section 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
10. Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
11. See Note, "Substantially To Lessen Competition . . .": Current Problems of
Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627 (1959).
12. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
13. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 291 U.S. 587
(1934); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
14. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); H.R. REP,. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).
15. United States v. Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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order.' 6 Failure of the original section 7 to cover asset acquisitions 17
and a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic
concentration led to an amendment of section 7 to cover asset acquisi-
tions by those corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission. Section 7, as amended in 1950 by the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act, provides in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.' 8
Since banks were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission, 9 subsequent to the passage of the amendment it was the
opinion of the Department of justice20 and various members of Con-
gress2 1 that section 7 was not applicable to bank mergers. As a result
of a trend toward increased concentration in banking,2 and apparently
in the belief that section 7 was not applicable to bank mergers,23
Congressional committee hearings were held on a total of seven bills
dealing with competitive aspects of bank mergers.2 These hearings
reflected opposing views as to the best method of halting the trend
16. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 13; see
Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transmerica Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 179 n.4 (1953).
17. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
"The purpose of the proposed legislation [the 1950 amendments to section 7] is to
prevent corporations from acquiring another corporation by means of the acquisition
of its assets, whereunder the present law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of
said corporation. Since the acquisition of stock is significant chiefly because it is likely
to result in control of the underlying assets, failure to prohibit direct purchase of the
same assets has been inconsistent and paradoxical as to the over-all effect of existing
law." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950). See H.R. REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
18. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
19. 72 Stat. 1750 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1958).
20. Attorney General Brownell told the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
with regard to bank mergers: "On the basis of these provisions the Department of
Justice has concluded, and all apparently agree, that asset acquisitions by banks are
not covered by section 7 as amended in 1950." Hearings on the Financial Institutions
Act of 1957 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1030 (1957).
21. See, e.g., remarks of Representative Spence, "The Clayton Act is ineffective as
to bank mergers because in the case of banks it covers only stock acquisitions and bank
mergers are not accomplished that way." 106 CoNe. REc. 7257 (1960).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1960).
23. "Since bank mergers are customarily, if not invariably, carried out by asset
acquisitions, they are exempt from section 7 of the Clayton Act." S. REP. No. 196, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959); see H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
24. Wemple & Cutler, The Federal Bank Merger Law and the Antitrust Laws, 16
Bus. LAw. 994 (1961).
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toward concentration; the Department of Justice favored amending
the Clayton Act to make section 7 applicable to bank asset acquisi-
tions, whereas the federal bank supervising agencies recommended the
regulatory approach which finally prevailed25 in the Bank Merger Act
of 1960.2 As originally introduced, the bill permitted, but did not
require, the banking agency to seek the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral as to the effect of the proposed merger on competition; 27 the Bank
Merger Act makes this a mandatory requirement except in emergency
situations. The Act does not contain an express antitrust exemption for
bank mergers which are approved by the appropriate agency, such as
those found in statutes applicable to certain other regulated indus-
tries 8 Although the Senate Committee report stated that competition
is desirable in banking,29 it further stated that competitive factors were
not to be controlling,30 and that the banking agencies were not bound
by the conclusions of the Attorney General on the competitive fac-
tors.
31
The instant case presented the Court with a question of first impres-
sion as to the applicability of amended section 7 to an acquiring cor-
poration not subject to the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction.
In enjoining the proposed merger of the two banks, the Court held
25. Ibid.
26. Under this Act, the appropriate banking agency passing upon the merger or
consolidation shall take into consideration the following banking factors: (1) the
financial history and condition of each bank involved; (2) the adequacy of its capital
structure; (3) its future earning prospects; (4) the general character of its management;
(5) the convenience and needs of the community to be served; and (6) whether or not
its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this Act.
In addition, "the appropriate agency shall also take into consideration the effect of
the transaction on competition (including any tendency toward monopoly), and shall
not approve the transaction unless, after considering all of such factors, it finds the
transaction to be in the public interest. In the interest of uniform standards, before
acting on a merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities
under this subsection, the agency . . . shall request a report on the competitive factors
involved from the Attorney General and the other tvo banking agencies . . . ." 74
Stat. 129 (1960), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963).
27. Wemple & Cutler, supra note 24.
28. 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958). This provision exempts from
antitrust laws certain consolidations approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
29. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959); see Klebaner, Federal Control
of Commercial Bank Mergers, 32 IND. L.J. 287 (1962).
30. "But it is impossible to require unrestricted competition in the field of banking,
and it would be impossible to subject banks to the rules applicable to ordinary industrial
and commercial concerns, not subject to regulations and not vested with a public
interest." S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959).
31. "The Committee wants to make crystal clear its intention that the various banking
factors in any particular case may be held to outweigh the competitive factors, and that
the competitive factors, however favorable or unfavorable, are not, in and of themselves,
controlling on the decision. And, of course, the banking agencies are not bound in their
consideration of the competitive factors by the report of the Attorney General." Id.
at 24.
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that by its terms section 7 reaches asset acquisitions only of corpora-
tions "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission."
Although this section would not bar a bank merger if it were con-
strued as a pure asset acquisition, the Court reasoned that a merger
fitted into the category neither of a pure asset acquisition nor of a
pure stock acquisition, but rather lay someplace between the two.
Therefore, section 7 would reach bank mergers and "the specific excep-
tion for acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC's jurisdiction
excludes from the coverage of § 7 only assets acquisitions by such
corporations when not accomplished by merger."- The Court based
this construction on a congressional design not only to reach transac-
tions involving a simple purchase of assets, which is not a merger, but
also to close the merger loophole. The Court reasoned that banks are
clearly embraced by the stock-acquisition provision and "that Con-
gress, in amending § 7, considered a distinction for antitrust purposes
between acquisition of corporate control by purchase of stock and
acquisition by merger unsupportable in reason, and sought to over-
rule the decisions of this Court which had recognized such a distinc-
tion."3 To exempt mergers of industries not subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission "would create a large loophole in a
statute designed to close a loophole."M Congress was aware of the
difference between a merger and a pure asset-acquisition; therefore,
the stock-acquisition provision of § 7, though reenacted in haec verba by the
1950 amendment, must be deemed expanded in its new context to include,
at the very least, acquisitions by merger or consolidation, transactions which
entail a transfer of stock of the parties, while the assets-acquisition provision
clearly reaches corporate acquisitions involving no such transfer.35
In further support of its decision, the Court stated that immunity from
the antitrust laivs is not lightly implied, especially in view of Congress'
failure to exempt the banking industry from the stock-acquisitions pro-
vision. While conceding that there may have been some uncertainty
as to the scope of section 7 and that this may have been a contributing
factor in the passage of the Bank Merger Act, the Court felt that it did
"no violence to that design by dispelling the uncertainty."3 In dis-
posing of the argument that the Bank Merger Act repeals pro tanto
the application of section 7 to the banking industry, the Court pointed
out that there was no express immunity and that repeals by implica-
tion are disfavored and "have only been found in cases of plain
32. 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963).
33. Id. at 343.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 346.
36. Id. at 349.
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repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." 37 "Al-
though the Comptroller was required to consider effect upon competi-
tion in passing upon appellees' merger application, he was not required
to give this factor any particular weight; he was not even required to
(and did not) hold a hearing before approving the application; and
there is no specific provision for judicial review of his decision."
The Court did not find the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" appli-
cable; that doctrine would not oust the Court's jurisdiction but merely
postpone it, and in the instant case, the Comptroller's proceedings
were completed before the antitrust action was commenced. "Further-
more, the considerations that militate against finding a repeal of the
antitrust laws by implication from the existence of a regulatory scheme
also argue persuasively against attenuating, by postponing, the Courts'
jurisdiction to enforce those laws."39 Therefore, section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act was held to cover the mergers of the banks and the Court did
not reach the further question of the alleged violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
Since section 7 applies to bank mergers an examination of the econo-
mic data must be undertaken to determine whether the merger is
proscribed by section 7. The statutory test of a proposed merger under
section 7 is whether the effect "in any line of commerce in any section
of the country" may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly. A merger is to be viewed functionally in the
context of its particular market.40 In examining an alleged violation
of section 7, the court must initially determine the relevant market
in order to ascertain whether the merger will substantially lessen com-
petition within it. 4 1 The relevant market is composed of two com-
ponents, a product or services market (line of commerce) and a
geographic market (any section of the country). As to the former,
the court should consider factors bearing on the cross-elasticity of
demand between the service itself and those of substitutes for it.4
The most characteristic product of commercial banks is the commercial
loan and as to this trade credit is the only important substitute, al-
though doubt has been expressed as to whether even this constitutes
a significant substitute.43 Various substitutes exist for many other com-
37. Id. at 351.
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 354.
40. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962).
41. United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957); see
Mann & Lewyn, The Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New
Cases-Two Different Views, 47 VA. L. BEy. 1014, 1015 (1961).
42. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 40, at 325.
43. "At best, however, even trade credit is a highly imperfect substitute for bank
loans, and, under most conditions, does not constitute a competitive alternative source
of supply." ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND CoMrainoN iN BA~NNG 19 (1954).
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mercial bank services, 4 these being provided by a diverse group of
non-bank institutions.45 However, these non-bank institutions may be
derivatively dependent upon banks for credit.46 In determining the
geographic market, "Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual ap-
proach.., not a formal, legalistic one. The geographic market selected
must, therefore, both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the
industry and be economically significant."47 The committee report
shows that Congress thought of relevant market as an effective area of
competition rather than simply a recognized geographic section of the
country.4 The relevant market will vary according to the product
under consideration. 49 After defining the relevant market, a court must
determine the permissibility of foreclosing a portion of the market by
a proposed merger. The tests for measuring legality under the Clayton
Act are less stringent than those of the Sherman Act, but a "foreclosure
of a de minimis share of the market will not tend 'substantially to
lessen competition."' 50 Nor did Congress "adopt a definition of the
word 'substantially' ...by which a merger's effects on competition
were to be measured."51 The tests under section 7 as amended "are
intended to be similar to those which the courts have applied in inter-
preting the same language as used in other sections of the Clayton
Act."52 In Standard Stations,53 a case under section 3 of the Clayton
Act, the primary test for illegality was the market share foreclosure.
This rule of "quantitative substantiality" says in essence that when a
merger forecloses a substantial portion of the market, it is legitimate
to infer a significant lessening of competition. This has been criti-
cized' as an automatic test of illegality; a contrary view contends that
44. For example: loans (real estate, agricultural, consumer, etc.), issuance of letters
of credit, securities transactions, rentals of safety deposit boxes, and trust services, to
name but a few.
45. For example: savings and loan associations, insurance companies, government,
consumer lending agencies, and private individuals.
46. See Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 37 IND. L.J. 287
(1962).
47. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 40, at 336-37.
48. "What constitutes a section will vary with the nature of the product. Owing to
the differences in the size and character of markets, it would be meaningless, from an
economic point of view, to attempt to apply for all products a uniform definition of
section, whether such a definition were based upon miles, population, income, or any
other unit of measurement." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
49. See Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L.
REv. 766, 778 (1952).
50. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 40, at 328-29.
51. Id. at 321.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 14, at 8.
53. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
54. "Sometimes, the market share foreclosed may be so large as to support the
necessary inference of substantially lessening of competitive opportunity. In others,
different market factors may be equally significant in determining whether section 7
has been transgressed. In no merger case-horizontal, vertical or conglomerate-can a
1963] 1223
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"substantial" has two distinct meanings for antitrust purposes: (1)
that it is an alternative to de minimis and signifies the fact that in-
substantial restraints are ignored by antitrust laws and that substan-
tial restraints are proscribed; (2) that "substantial" is not de-
termined by whether the share goes somewhat beyond de minimis,
but rather whether it has at least a demonstrable potentiality of signifi-
cant anticompetitive effect.55 If such an effect is found, further proof
of the effect on competition is foreclosed by the inference that the
forbidden slackening of competitive activity will necessarily follow.5"
The Third Circuit in Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors"7
vacated a Federal Reserve Board antimerger order on the basis that
the Board had misapplied the relevant market test. By way of dictum
the court added that the quantitative substantiality test of Standard
Stations was inapplicable to section 7 and that the reasonable proba-
bility of a substantial lessening of competition "must appear from the
circumstances of the particular case and be found as facts before the
sanctions of the statute may be invoked. Evidence of mere size and
participation in a substantial share of the line of business involved...
is not enough."58 In the recent Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co.5 9 case arising under section 3, the Court implied that illegality
would not be based solely on market foreclosure and that it would
look beyond the inference from the foreclosure and examine the
potential short-run and long-run effects on competition.60 Since section
7 speaks in terms of the future effect of the merger, a history of con-
centration within the industry is a factor to be considered.
61
The Court concluded from an examination of the economic factors
that the proposed merger was unlawful under section 7. It determined
that commercial banking was a distinct "line of commerce" which is
"'sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities.' "62
This finding was predicated upon the distinctiveness of some services
(checking accounts), the cost advantages of others (personal loans),
and finally "a settled consumer preference"63 for still others. With
'quantitative substantiality' rule substitute for the market tests section 7 prescribes."
ATronnu GsxA.s' NAoNAL Coi rrITEE TO STruy m A- rrnusT LAws 122
(1955).
55. Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J.
1, 30-31 (1959).
56. Raskind, Trade Regulation-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAM. L. REv. 965,
969 (1962).
57. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
58. Id. at 170.
59. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
60. See 15 V m. L. REv. 617 (1962).
61. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 40, at 332.
62. 374 U.S. at 357, quoting from Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
296 F.2d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961).
63. 374 U.S. at 357.
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regard to the relevant geographic market, the Court recognized that
the size of the borrower may determine where he does his banking
business, the large borrower perhaps finding it practical to bank
outside his home community, the very small borrower possibly con-
fined to his immediate neighborhood. Defining the geographic
market to take into account only the largest borrowers would result
in a market so expansive that the effect of the merger upon competi-
tion would be insignificant, while considering only smallest borrowers
would result in placing appellees in a different market. Therefore, the
four county area "in which bank customers that are neither very large
nor very small find it practical to do their banking business, is a more
appropriate 'section of the country', in which to appraise the instant
merger than any larger or smaller or different area."64 The Court said
the proper question "is not where the parties to the merger do
business or even where they compete, but where, within the area
of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will
be direct and immediate."65 After so defining the relevant market,
the Court turned to the question of whether the proposed merger
would result in a "substantial lessening of competition." In response
to this, it said:
[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects. 66
Since the resulting bank would control at least thirty per cent of the
bank assets of the area the Court found this to be an undue threat
to competition. The appellees proposed three affirmative justifications
for the merger: that only through merger could the banks follow their
customers to the suburbs; that the increased lending limit of the
resulting bank will enable it to compete with large out-of-town banks
(countervailing power argument);67 and that Philadelphia needed a
larger bank to bring business and stimulate its economic development.
Each of these propositions was examined by the Court and rejected.
It was noted that there had been a strong trend toward mergers in
the area, the Court stating in this regard: "A fundamental purpose
of amending § 7 was to arrest the trend toward concentration, the
tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared
through merger, and that purpose would be ill-served if the law stayed
64. Id. at 361.
65. Id. at 357.
66. Id. at 363.
67. See generally GABIA=m-, Ammuc CArrAism (1952).
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its hand until 10, or 20, or 30 more Philadelphia banks were ab-
sorbed."6
In determining whether a proposed merger violates section 7, it
would seem that the Court must consider the market consequences
in terms of structure and performance within the context of the
particular industry. The assets of a commercial bank are largely
generated by loans to and deposits of both large and small customers,
who are not necessarily within the same geographic market for bank-
ing services. As the Court recognized, the largest of those depositors
function within a national, even an international market; the smaller
depositors seek loans and banking services within the city in which
they reside. It would therefore appear that merely to determine the
total assets of the proposed merger and predicate a resulting economic
effect upon this total would not necessarily be an adequate reflection
of the degree of market foreclosure. A determination of the character
of the depositors according to size might be preferable. Then the
assets considered in determining the degree of market foreclosure
could be limited to those generated by customers who are in fact in
the geographic market. It is conceivable that two banks in the
practice of catering to the larger customer could merge and the
resulting percentage of the total commercial bank assets might be
substantial. However, if their customers in fact functioned within a
national market, there would seem to be no substantial lessening of
competition within the community. Merely looking to the total asset
concentration that would result from a proposed merger of commercial
banks is not itself a complete guide for antitrust purposes, even if the
character of the demand deposits is considered. In determining com-
petition in banking, alternative sources of supply are important,6
and as to the smaller customers, the number of banks in a community
may measure alternative sources.70 In the instant case, there would
have been forty-one banks remaining in the Philadelphia area if the
merger had been consummated. If the relevant geographic market
is defined as the metropolitan area, perhaps the decline in the number
of banks would be material. Since the Court is extending section 7
to a regulated industry such as banking, the tests designed to reflect
the actual anticompetitive effects must take into consideration the
particular character and relevant market in the context of its regula-
tion. Section 7's test of illegality is a modified quantitative substan-
tiality doctrine. This is derived from the Court's principal reliance
upon market share foreclosure, and although the majority does not
specify the smallest market share it would consider as a threat of
68. 374 U.S. at 367.
69. AmADEFF, op. cit. supra note 43, at 21.
70. Ibid.
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undue concentration, they held it "clear that 30% presents that
threat."7' However, the Court's examination of the appellee's affirma-
tive justifications suggests that the quantitative share has been
modified to a standard in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and
that the Court is willing to consider arguments justifying the lessening
of competition. The case's significance lies in the Court's application
of section 7 to mergers of corporations not subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission. Justification for this appears
tenuous, for at the time of the passage of amended section 7 judicial
decisions had rendered the stock-acquisitions clause powerless to bar
mergers. The addition of an assets-acquisition provision which ex-
cluded from its operation industries not subject to the jurisdiction of
the FTC does not seem to manifest an intent on the part of Congress
to subject such industries to the application of section 7 with respect
to mergers. As the Court points out, although "'[T]he views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent
of an earlier one,' "72 the legislative history of the Bank Merger Act
indicates an intent on the part of Congress to treat the banking in-
dustry under a different standard than that embodied in section 7.
In substance, this opinion requires the Comptroller to consider the
anticompetitive consequences of a proposed merger within the context
of section 7; if he approves such a merger having anticompetitive
effects sufficient to otherwise be proscribed by section 7, he must
justify his approval by considerations of solvency, stability, or mone-
tary policy. However, the effect is to give the courts the ultimate
determination of whether the merger meets the "public interest"
criterion of the Bank Merger Act. There is a body of opinion con-
tending that congressional preference for the competitive mode should
not be conclusive in banking, for as expressed by Professor Berle:
Operations in deposit banking not only affect the commercial field, but also
determine in great measure the supply of credit, the volume of money, the
value of the dollar, and even, perhaps, the stability of the currency system.
Within this area considerations differing from and far more powerful than
mere preservation of competition may be operating under direct sanction
of law .... A bank failure is a community disaster, however, wherever, and
whenever it occurs. While competition may be desirable up to a point in
deposit banking, there is a clear bottom limit to its desirability.73
In view of the interest in a stable banking system, perhaps the bank
regulatory authorities should be permitted to weigh the effects of a
merger in relation to the banking system as a whole and to predicate
71. 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963).
72. Id. at 348-49, quoting from United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
73. Berle, Banking Under the Anti-trust Laws, 49 CoLum. L. REV. 589, 592 (1949);
see Funk, Antitrust Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 12 Bus. LAw. 496, 505 (1957).
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decisions upon considerations of a national monetary policy rather
than being limited by antitrust definitions of "substantial lessening of
competition." This seems especially true in view of the fact that
Congress has repeatedly refused to make section 7 considerations
determinative of whether a bank merger is in the "public interest" and
therefore to be permitted. Also, it is doubtful whether the courts are
the optimum forum for reconciling the interest in competition with
the often countervailing interests of stability and solvency.
Constitutional Law-Appointment of Counsel for
Indigent Defendants in State Criminal Trials
Defendant, charged with the felony' of breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor, appeared in a state court without
funds to employ a lawyer. His request that counsel be appointed to
assist him was denied on the ground that the state statute2 provided
for appointment of counsel only in "capital cases where the defendant
is insolvent . . . ." Defendant conducted his own defense during the
trial and was found guilty by a jury. A habeas corpus petition, alleging
that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel for him was a denial of
his constitutional rights, was presented to the Florida Supreme Court
and was denied without opinion.3 On certiorari in the Supreme Court
of the United States, held, reversed. An indigent defendant in a non-
capital state criminal prosecution has the right to appointed counsel
as a requisite of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
At common law in England an accused had the right to employ
counsel in misdemeanor cases, but not in trials for felony.4 Even be-
fore the Revolution, American courts were generally more liberal than
the English, and permitted counsel to assume an increasingly greater
role in criminal defense; but as late as 1800 only two states provided
lawyers for indigent defendants, and the right to counsel in other
states meant only the right to be represented at trial at one's own ex-
pense.5 In Powell v. Alabama6 the Supreme Court held that the right
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.05 (1944).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.21 (Supp. 1962).
3. 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961).
4. BEANEc, THE RicHT TO CouNsEL xN A EmcA CoUTs 8-9 (1955).
5. Id. at 21.
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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to appointed counsel in certain capital cases 7 in state courts is a "funda-
mentar' right embraced within the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and is therefore essential to a valid conviction. Hamilton
v. Alabama8 held this to be an unqualified right in every capital case.9
In 1938 the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel 0 in federal courts
was placed on a jurisdictional basis in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst;"
that case was the first to construe the sixth amendment as having the
effect of depriving a federal court of jurisdiction if counsel were not ap-
pointed for an indigent defendant. 12 In the noncapital case of Betts v.
Brady3 the Court considered "whether due process of law demands
that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must
furnish counsel to an indigent defendant."14 A divided Court held that
the particular circumstances of each case must be considered to deter-
mine whether, upon an appraisal of all the facts, the refusal of counsel
was "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right . ..."15 Subsequent right-to-counsel cases were judged by this
standard, 16 and "special circumstances" were found with such increas-
ing regularity 7 that Mr. Justice Black was prompted to comment in
one case that "twenty years' experience in the state and federal courts
with the Betts v. Brady rule has demonstrated its basic failure as a
constitutional guide. Indeed, it has served not to guide but to confuse
7. "All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law .. Id. at 71.
8. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
9. "When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop
to determine whether prejudice resulted." Id. at 55.
10. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
12. "Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entities one charged with crime to
the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a
necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence." Id.
at 467-68.
13. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14. Id. at 464.
15. Id. at 473.
16. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Pennsylvania ex rel. Her-
man v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Palmer
v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsyl-
vania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
17. "In noncapital cases, the 'special circumstances' rule has continued to exist in
form while its substance has been substantially and steadily eroded. In the first decade
after Betts, there were cases in which the Court found special circumstances to be
lacking, but usually by a sharply divided vote. However, no such decision has been
cited to us, and I have found none, after . .. 1950." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). (Footnote omitted.)
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the courts as to when a person prosecuted by a State for crime is
entitled to a lawyer."18
In the principal case a unanimous Court specifically overruled
Betts v. Brady, explaining that that case had "departed from the sound
wisdom upon which the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested."19
Using the Powell decision as the basis for its reasoning,20 the Court
held that the sixth amendments guarantee of counsel is one of the
fundamental rights which are esssential to a fair trial under the four-
teenth amendment. However, Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion
did not specify that all of the provisions of the sixth amendment were
made obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment,
as he has recently urged in a concurring opinion in Carnley v. Coch-
ran," and as Mr. Justice Douglas advocated in his separate opinion
in the principal case. Mr. Justice Clark, concurring in the result, noted
that Gideon simply abolished the rule that classified the need for ap-
pointed counsel according to whether the accused was charged with
a capital or a noncapital crime. A separate concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Harlan expressed the view that the "special circumstances"
rule of Betts v. Brady had been eroded over the years, yet was en-
titled to a more respectful burial as a part of the evolution of cases
interpreting the due process clause. In conclusion he added, "In what
is done today I do not understand the Court to... embrace the con-
cept that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the Sixth Amend-
ment as such."22
In the instant case the Court formally abandoned the concept that
the need for an attorney's assistance, and consequently the right to ap-
pointed counsel for indigent defendants, can be ascertained on the
basis of a distinction between capital and noncapital crimes. However,
the extent of this right was purposely left undefined. It is submitted
that the need for legal representationF1 is not necessarily lessened by
virtue of the fact that an accused is charged with a misdemeanor rather
than a felony, or a crime that carries a short prison sentence instead
of a lengthy one. As was observed in Betts v. Brady, if charges of
18. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 518 (1962) (concurring opinion).
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
20. "While the Court at the close of its Powell opinion did by its language, as this
Court frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of
that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are
unmistakable." Id. at 343.
21. Supra note 18.
22. 372 U.S. at 352.
23. A survey found that approximately 30% to 60% of defendants appearing in
criminal courts are without funds to employ an attorney. SPECIAL CoM MIFE or TMn
Ass'N OF THE BAn OF Ton Crry OF NEW YoRK & THE NATIONAL LEGAL Amn & DE-
FENDER ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AccusED 80 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL
JUsnCE].
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small crimes and capital offenses equally require a lawyer's assistance,
the right-to-counsel argument might apply with equal force even in
traffic courts and civil cases, as well as at arraignment, habeas corpus
hearings, and upon appeal. It is unlikely, however, that the right to
appointed counsel will be extended to every conceivable offense. Later
refinements of the Gideon holding may therefore delineate a practical
rule that would require the appointment of attorneys for indigent
accused only for certain serious offenses and their related hearings
and appeals, such as felonies, certain misdemeanors, or, as Mr. Justice
Harlan noted in his concurring opinion in the principal case, crimes
which "carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence."25 Never-
theless, a precise rule that will afford equal justice in every instance
will be difficult to formulate, and it has been suggested that a compre-
hensive standard may also have to depend upon an evaluation of facts
and circumstances, in the manner in which the now-abandoned "spec-
ial circumstances" rule of Betts v. Brady was applied to more serious
crimes. 26 It is also likely that Gideon will encourage reconsideration
of the methods by which lawyers are selected to defend the indigent,
with a view toward improving the quality of representation and the
provisions for compensating assigned counsel. 7
Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-State Action-
Effect of Standard Urban Redevelopment
Land Use Covenant
Defendants own and operate a motel in an urban redevelopment
project financed jointly by federal, state, and local governmental
agencies and developed by the Nashville Housing Authority. The land
on which the motel stands was conveyed to defendants by warranty
deed,1 subject to certain recorded covenants running with the land.
24. "[A]s the Fourteenth Amendment extends the protection of due process to prop-
erty as well as to life and liberty . . . logic would require the furnishing of counsel in
civil cases involving property." 316 U.S. at 473.
25. 372 U.S. at 351.
26. Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process Values, 61 MicH. L. REv. 219, 260-72 (1962).
27. For an evaluation of the various systems used for the appointment of counsel
for the indigent accused, see EQuAL JusncE; Note, The Representation of Indigent
Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HAEv. L. REv. 579 (1963).
1. This was a standard-form warranty deed. Deeds of this type are used whenever
land which has been redeveloped partially with federal funds is sold. This fact brings
within the scope of this holding vast properties located in jointly financed urban rede-
velopment projects across the United States.
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By these covenants, the deed, and the contract of sale, the Housing
Authority retains a measure of control over the use of the property.
All uses, constructions, alterations, or changes of the property are sub-
ject to the approval of the Authority, and the Authority retains the
right to sue for injunctive relief as well as for damages in the event
the covenants should be broken. Plaintiff, a Negro, requested and was
denied accommodations at the motel because of his race. He brought
a class action in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee for declaratory judgment to restrain defendant
from continuing these discriminatory practices, alleging them to be in
violation of the fifth amendment and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. De-
fendants contended that the discriminatory practices described by
plaintiff constituted private action, and that all governmental involve-
ment had ended with the execution of the warranty deed. Held, judg-
ment for plaintiff. The equal protection clause prohibits racial dis-
crinination by a privately-owned business enterprise situated on land
in an urban redevelopment project, subject to standard urban rede-
velopment land use covenants. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America,
Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
The Supreme Court established in the Civil Rights Cases2 the
doctrine that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
protects the individual only against that discriminatory action which
can properly be called state action. This "state action" doctrine was
later defined by the Court to include the acts of state agencies 3 at any
level of the state government,4 as well as the acts of an executive
officer of the state,5 even when the officer acts in violation of a state
statute.6 The acts of private groups have been found to constitute
state action when the private group assumes or is clothed with a
measure of governmental authority,7 or when the group acts under
powers granted by the state.8 State action has also been found when
2. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). A single opinion by the Court announced the decision in five
separate cases testing the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (Act of
March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335), which in part prohibited racial discrimination on public
conveyances and in inns, theaters, and other places of public amusement.
3. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
4. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
5. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
6. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Williams, The Twilight of
State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347, 352-55 (1963).
7. Thus state action was found when officials of a company-owned-and-operated
municipality failed to guarantee the religious liberties of its citizens. Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
8. State action was found in the acts of a political party, acting under authority
granted by the state, in conducting a primary election in a discriminatory manner.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Even when the state discontinues all participa-
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the government by its inactivity permits private individuals to de-
prive other citizens of their constitutionally guaranteed liberties.9 In
Shelley v. Kraemer0 the Court held that although private individuals
could enter into agreements containing racially discriminative cove-
nants, any attempt by the state judiciary to enforce these covenants
by granting injunctive relief would constitute state action. A similar
result was later reached with respect to the awarding of damages by
a state court." The Court held in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority2 that when a private party leases government property and
conducts business activities thereon in a discriminatory manner, his
acts constitute state action because the state still maintains a significant
involvement in the enterprise.
13
The court in the instant case applied the test for state action 14 which
was established by the Supreme Court in Burton. This test involves
the sifting and weighing of relevant facts to ascertain the true signifi-
cance of the state's involvement in the private conduct. Private acts
would constitute state action, according to this test, if the state is
found to be involved in the enterprise to a "significant extent."15 Con-
sidering the facts in the instant case-the state's right of approval of
the use and alteration of the land or buildings constructed thereon,
tion in political parties and primaries and exercises no control whatsoever, federal courts
have still declared the acts of the parties to be state action because political parties
have become in effect state institutions. Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949);
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
Many devices have been employed to attempt to separate the private political organiza-
tion from the state. The Court has nonetheless looked at the results and held that when
primary victory is tantamount to election the party or group acts as the state no matter
how far removed from state control it may be. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
9. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926). State action was found
when the local sheriff failed to grant protection to a Jehovah's Witness group meeting
within his jurisdiction, thus allowing private citizens to deprive them of their constitu-
tional right to gather and worship. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir.
1943). This "state inaction" theory has, however, been rejected by a majority of federal
courts. See 21 LA. L. REv. 433, 447 (1961).
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
12. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
13. Whether the lease is a good faith agreement, as in Burton, or one created for the
express purpose of avoiding the enforced cessation of discriminatory practices, as in
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948), is not the primary con-
sideration. The controlling factor seems to be the substantial interest in the property
retained by the municipality.
14. 220 F. Supp. at 7-8.
15. "[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved in it. . . . [T]o fashion and apply a precise
formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an
'impossible task' which 'this Court has never attempted.' Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552, 556. Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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and the over-all public purpose of the project' 6-and applying this test
to them, the court reached the conclusion that it could not be real-
istically denied that the state bad retained a significant interest and
involvement in the motel.17 The court dismissed the fact that Burton
dealt with a lease while the instant case concerns the sale of property,
declaring the difference between the two to be "more technical than
real" 18 and restating that the crucial issue is not the form of the
transaction but rather the presence of significant state involvement.
The court in the instant case, while purporting to follow the spirit
of Burton, may have overextended the principle of that case. Burton
did set up a test, albeit not a standard, for courts to employ in ascer-
taining the presence of state action in other situations. But by its own
application of the test, the Court in Burton also demonstrated by
example the type of factual situation which constitutes a "significant
involvement." In Burton the building which housed the discrimina-
torily operated enterprise was built with public funds, owned by the
city, and used primarily for a public purpose. Public funds were
used for its upkeep and maintenance. 19 The restaurant located therein
was considered an integral part of the public service. Considering all
of these facts the Court found the state to be a "joint participant" in
the challenged activity.20 None of these significant factors were
present in the instant case. The motel was privately financed, owned,
and operated, and was maintained on private property. The only
public purpose manifested in the project is the city's desire to keep
16. "So completely are the private owners in the Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project
burdened with governmental restrictions and controls that not even the slightest change
can be made in the use of their properties without the prior approval of a public
agency. Nor without similar public approval can alterations or improvements of any
kind be made in any buildings or structures located upon such properties." 220 F. Supp.
at 8.
In addition to this element of control retained over future use and enjoyment of the
property, the court emphasized the fact that the net project cost is estimated to be
$7,810,768, of which two-thirds, or $5,207,179, will be provided in grants from the
federal government; the remaining one-third, or $2,603,589, is to come from state and
local governments; income from the sale of the land will cover little over one-third of
the gross cost. Id. at 4. The government thus helped to establish these private enter-
prises at a cost to the taxpayer of almost eight million dollars.
17. "[State involvement is evident] not only in the conception formulation, develop-
ment, and carrying out of the overall public plan and project, but also in its continua-
tion and perpetuation." Id. at 8.
18. Ibid.
19. "Upkeep and maintenance of the building, including necessary repairs, were
responsibilities of the [Wilmington Parking] Authority and were payable out of public
funds." 365 U.S. at 724.
20. "Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is that when
a State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been
the case here, the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with
by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the agree-
ment itself." Id. at 726.
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the area physically attractive and free from undesirable enterprises.
For this purpose the city retained some control over the land through
the restrictive covenants. To hold that the result in Burton requires
the result reached in the instant case is to extend the Burton test well
beyond the facts to which it was there applied.21 The wisdom of this
extension is at least doubtful, considering the applicability of the
reasoning in this decision to discriminatory practices within other
private enterprises conducted on property redeveloped partially with
federal funds and conveyed by similar warranty deed.
Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion-Denial
of Unemployment Compensation to
Seventh-Day Adventist
Petitioner, a Seventh-Day Adventist, had been dismissed by her
employer for her refusal to work on Saturdays as required by new
work rules.1 She subsequently refused to accept employment at other
mills which required Saturday work on the ground that it was contrary
to her religious beliefs to work on Saturday. In accordance with the
relevant South Carolina law petitioner filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits with the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission.3 The Commission denied petitioner's claim, ruling that
she did not meet the statutory requirements that an applicant must
(1) be available for work and (2) accept suitable work when offered,
unless having good cause to refuse.4 Petitioner commenced an action
21. This is still not as much of an extension as Justice Douglas suggests in his con-
curring opinion in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963), where he suggests that
any time a state licenses a business it has sufficient interest and activity with the busi-
ness to cause it to be state action when the business is conducted discriminatorily.
"State licensing and surveillance of a business serving the public also brings its service
into the public domain." Id. at 282.
1. She had been employed for thirty-five years by Spartan Mills, a textile firm. Dur-
ing this time Saturday work had been a voluntary matter left to the discretion of the
individual employees. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
2. Petitioner could find no other suitable work which did not require Saturday work.
Out of 150 Seventh-Day Adventists in the area only petitioner and one other were
unable to find suitable employment not requiring Saturday work. Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. S.C. CODE §§ 68-113, -114 (1952).
4. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 1. Section 68-113 makes one eligible for benefits
only if he is available for work. Section 68-114 disqualifies any applicant who fails,
without good cause, to accept suitable work. Thus the statute imposes a double require-




seeking judicial review of the Commission's ruling. The trial court dis-
missed the action and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed.5
On certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, held, re-
versed. A state court's denial of unemployment compensation benefits
on the ground that refusal because of a religious conviction to accept
a job entailing Saturday work is a failure without good cause to
accept suitable work denies the applicant his constitutional right to
the free exercise of his religious beliefs under the first amendment as
applicable through the fourteenth amendment.6 Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
The unemployment compensation laws of all fifty states have pro-
visions requiring (1) that a claimant must be available for work before
becoming eligible for unemployment benefits and (2) that a claimant
must accept suitable work when offered or become disqualified from
receiving benefits. 7 While it is conceivable that a person might satisfy
one provision and fail to fulfill the other, in most cases it is found
either that both requirements were met, or that neither was met.8 Gen-
erally a person is available for work if he is physically able and is
willing to accept suitable work which he does not have good cause to
refuse. 9 The question of what work is suitable is generally determined
by a consideration of the reasonableness of the work in the light of the
claimant's past experience and his present situation.10 The close rela-
5. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 1.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." While Justice Brennan spoke
of the state statutory grounds in terms of the provisions of S.C. CODE § 68-114 (accept-
ing of suitable work), the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the provisions of S.C.
CODE § 68-113 (requiring a person to be available for work) as well.
7. ALTmAN, AvwAnAmrrY FOR WoRx 74 (1950). For a list of the availability
provisions in each state code, see id. at 264-82. See Sanders, Disqualification for Un-
employment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REv. 307 (1955), for a discussion of the acceptance-
of-suitable-work doctrine. See Williams, Eligibility for Benefits, 8 VAND. L. REV. 286
(1955), for a discussion of the available-for-work doctrine. See also Freeman, Able To
Work and Available for Work, 55 YAL.E L.J. 123 (1945); Comment, 4 VAND. L. REv.
206 (1950).
8. The distinction between the two requirements is made in Krauss v. Karagheusian,
Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953).
9. Williams, supra note 7, at 290.
10. Sanders, supra note 7, at 325-33, gives a complete list of the relevant factors in
determining the suitability of work. The following are some illustrative cases of what
courts consider to be suitable or unsuitable accommodations to the statutory require-
ments: Work is suitable if it is identical with the claimant's previous type of employment,
Sweeney v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 177 Pa. Super. 243, 110 A.2d
843 (1955), or if the plaintiff is capable of performing the work, Hess Bros. v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 174 Pa. Super. 115, 100 A.2d 120 (1953).
However, even part time work, to be suitable, must be similar to previous employment
conditions. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hays, 353 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962). The claimant must be willing to work an average work week. Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951). He cannot re-
fuse to work solely because of personal hardship. Mills v. South Carolina Unemploy-
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tionship between the two requirements of availability for and accept-
ance of suitable work is evidenced by the fact that the other state
courts which have considered the issue have largely failed to distin-
guish the two requirements." The highest courts of Michigan, North
Carolina, and Ohio have decided the question of whether a religious
conviction against working on Saturday is "good cause" for refusal to
accept employment within the meaning of their unemployment com-
pensation statutes; they have uniformly held that a person refusing
work because of such religious conviction is "available for work" and
has not refused to "accept suitable work" within the meaning of the
applicable statute.' 2 Each of these state courts based its decision on a
ment Compensation Comm'n, 204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E.2d 535 (1944) (claimant unable to
work third shift because of lack of babysitter for her four children).
In each instance if a person has either left his employment, or refused to accept
available employment, the courts will determine if good cause for his action exists.
Marriage is good cause for leaving employment. Shaw v. Lubin, 6 App. Div. 2d 354,
177 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958). Refusal to take a loyalty oath is sufficient. Syrek v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 519, 354 P.2d 625 (1960). The following
were found to be insufficient reasons for claims to be allowed: Inability to work a
rotating shift because of college studies. Douty v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 194 Pa. Super. 220, 166 A.2d 65 (1960). Claimant's failure to cross hostile
picket lines. Deere Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 249 Iowa 1066,
90 N.W.2d 750 (1958). Workers laid off because of labor dispute. Adamski v. State
of Ohio, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 108 Ohio App. 198, 161 N.E.2d 907
(1959).
11. It is interesting to note that the several opinions by the United States Supreme
Court in Sherbert failed to clearly distinguish the two statutory bases for compensation.
This may be due in part to the fact that the Court was not interested in an interpreta-
tion of the statute, but was concerned with the effect of denying benefits to someone
in petitioner's position.
12. Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.
2d 907 (1954); In re Miller, 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956); Tary v. Board of
Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56
(1954). The Tary case clearly sets forth Ohio's position on the issue, and the Ohio
court cleared up any doubt by distinguishing Kut v. Albers Super Mkts., Inc., 146 Ohio
St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643 (1946), one of the cases relied upon by the South Carolina
Supreme Court. 161 Ohio St. at 257, 119 N.E.2d at 59. The following state unemploy-
ment commissions similarly have said that persons refusing to work on their Sabbath
are not ineligible for benefits: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington,
and the District of Columbia. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 1, at 310, 125 S.E.2d at
749 (Bussey, J., dissenting). Judge Bussey gives as a reference for such information the
Benefits Series Service, a publication of the Department of Labor. Ibid. The South
Carolina Supreme Court felt that the legislature did not intend for persons in petitioner's
position to receive benefits. 240 S.C. at 293, 125 S.E.2d at 740. This interpretation
has been criticized as being too narrow. 76 H.Av. L. REv. 854 (1963). Contra, 14
S.C.L.Q. 567 (1962). See also 111 U. PA. L. REv. 253 (1962). Many cases have dealt
with the problem of whether the claimant had good cause for quitting work, and was
thus available for work. E.g., Kut v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 329 U.S.
669, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 827 (1946); Gatewood v. Iowa Iron & Metal Co., 251
Iowa 639, 102 N.W.2d 146 (1960); Kut v. Albers Super Mkts., Inc., supra; Sun Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 358 Pa. 224,
56 A.2d 254 (1948); Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm'n,
219 S.C. 239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951); Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compen-
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construction of the particular statute involved, an adequate state
ground, making it unnecessary to reach any constitutional issue. That
all the states, other than South Carolina, which have been presented
with the issue of whether a religious belief was "good cause" within the
meaning of the unemployment compensation statutes have reached the
same result may bear on the constitutional issue in that the result
emphasizes the strong individual interest at stake, while indicating no
strong state interest to the contrary. The central inquiry in these cases
seems to be the reasonableness of the restrictions which the claimant
himself places upon his availability, and the reasonableness of claim-
ant's refusal to work at a particular type job when it is offered.
The Supreme Court has never before been presented with the
precise issue of the instant case. However, since 1947 the Court has
been confronted with numerous cases involving first amendment
13
questions of religious freedom and the relationship of church and
state.14 The controlling principle has been stated to be one of required
governmental neutrality in matters of religion-that is, the government
must refrain from handicapping or favoring religious beliefs or prac-
tices as such. On the same day the instant case was decided, the Court
handed down its decision in the Schempp case, 15 holding on the basis
of the establishment clause that a government which is neutral cannot
sation Comm'n, supra note 10; Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Tomko, supra
note 10.
13. The fourteenth amendment makes applicable to the states the free exercise clause
of the first amendment and thus prohibits any state from obstructing any person's free
exercise of his religious beliefs. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Al-
though it is clear that the fourteenth amendment applies the requirements of the first
amendment to the states, the Court and particularly Mr. Justice Black have been
criticized on this point. BRADY, CoNFUsIoN TWICE CoNFoubmiED 171 (2d ed. 1955).
It has been said that the first amendment reflects the philosophy that church and
state must be separate. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Everson and McCollum
decisions are criticized in BRADY, op. cit. supra, at 184-92.
For a discussion of cases dealing with separation of church and state, see Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1961); Paulsen, State
Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REv. 620, 635
(1951).
14. The cases since World War II dealing with religious freedom are too numerous
and far-reaching to be covered in this comment. Those cases dealing with the estab-
lishment clause have been treated in 16 V,,ND. L. REv. 205 (1962). In the landmark
case of Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 13, the Court upheld a state statute
authorizing reimbursement to parents for money expended for transportation to parochial
schools. Recently in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), a New Yorkc school practice
of compulsory prayer recitation at the beginning of each school day was held unconsti-
tutional. This was followed by Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
handed down the same day as the Sherbert case, in which the required reading of Bible
verses and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools were held to violate the
establishment clause of the first amendment.
15. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra note 14.
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require essentially religious ceremonies to be carried out in its schools.
All of the cases interpreting the free exercise clause of the first amend-,
ment necessarily represent some claimed infringement of a person's
right to exercise his religious beliefs or practices. The Court has some-
times found a sufficiently strong state interest in promoting some
secular or non-religious objective to allow an infringement on religious
practices without violating this constitutional right.16 Thus, it was held
that the practice of polygamy might be constitutionally restricted,
though the restriction interfered with the religious practices of a
certain sect.17 But more often the Court has refused to restrain the reli-
gious practices, finding that the alleged state secular interest was un-
supported by compelling reasons which would justify the attempted
infringements. 8 The permitted state infringements upon the exercise
of religious practices or scruples may be classified according to the
sanctions imposed, that is, the burden placed upon the person for con-
tinuing to exercise his religious scruple. 19 The Court will proceed to
examine the state interest, moral, economic, or whatever, and compare
this with the individuals scruple and the sanction imposed on its
exercise. Thus, if the state finds the exercise of the religious scruple to
be especially objectionable to the public interest, it may well directly
impose a criminal sanction on the exercise of that scruple.20 In other
instances the state legislature may decide not to directly prohibit the
exercise of the scruple, but may cause a burden to be placed on such
exercise. Such was the case in Braunfeld v. Brown,21 which involved a
state law prohibiting the operation of certain businesses on Sunday.
Even though the petitioner in that case closed his store on Saturday for
religious reasons, and thus had one less day of business each week, his
16. "However, the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with one's
religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions." Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
17. Reynolds v. United States, supra note 13. This case involved the Morman prac-
tice of taking more than one wife, which was within the keeping of the tenets of their
religion. For other examples of state interests which justified certain infringements, see
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
18. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the state's proven interest in ob-
taining the veracity of notaries public was not a sufficient reason for the infringement
of appellants' religious freedom by denying them that office because of their refusal to
take a required oath of belief in God.
19. In Reynolds v. United States, supra note 13, the religious scruple involved was
the practice of polygamy; the sanction for such exercise was a criminal law. In Prince
v. Massachusetts, supra note 17, a criminal statute was held valid which denied chil-
dren under a certain age the freedom to distribute literature, although the child's reli-
gious faith compelled her to do so.
20. But cf. Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the Court held invalid
a state statute prohibiting the teaching at a private school in a foreign language. In
Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948), 2 VAn. L. REv. 694 (1949),
a statute prohibiting snake handling by a religious sect was held valid.
21. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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interest was held to be outweighed by the state interest in providing a
uniform day of rest.22 The indirect economic burden imposed in that
case was in some respects similar to the one imposed in the instant
case, and will later be considered in such light. As is evidenced by the
present case, in no event will any sanctions be upheld unless the Court
feels that morals, safety, health, or some other paramount state interest
demands such sanctions. 23
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, went immediately to the
free exercise issue.24 He found that a burden was placed on the exer-
cise of petitioner's religious convictions,2 which burden was not out-
weighed by any paramount state interest 6 The Court found that the
only possible state interest was that the allowing of such a claim would
raise the possibility of unscrupulous persons filing fraudulent claims
22. Ibid. This is one of the Sunday Closing Law cases. In Braunfeld v. Brown,
supra note 21, and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961), there
was no denial of free exercise. The free exercise issue was not raised in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
23. Thus a state may protect the moral standards of its citizens by prohibiting the
practice of polygamy even though it is an integral part of a person's religious convictions.
Reynolds v. United States, supra note 13. However, the Court made clear in Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953), that this is a narrow exception to the general
rule that religious beliefs of all kinds are protected. Under certain conditions a state
may require a license before a group may hold religious services in a public park.
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). The great majority of cases, however,
sustain the rights of religious minorities to act without governmental interference.
Torcaso v. Watkins, supra note 18; Poulos v. New Hampshire, supra; Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584 (1942), vacated and rev'd on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, supra note 13.
24. 374 U.S. at 402. However, Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, quotes from the South
Carolina Code and declares that the purpose of the statute was to provide relief to
persons for whom work was unavailable, and that within the meaning of that statute
work was available for petitioner: "The fact that these personal considerations sprang
from her religious convictions was wholly without relevance to the state court's applica-
tion of the law. Thus in no proper sense can it be said that the State discriminated
against the appellant on the basis of her religious beliefs or that she was denied benefits
because she was a Seventh-Day Adventist. She was denied benefits just as any other
claimant would be denied benefits who was not 'available for work' for personal reasons."
Id. at 420.
25. Id. at 403. "Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility
for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to
forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Govern-
mental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise
of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id. at
404.
26. Id. at 407.
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based on religious grounds.27 He also pointed out that although un-
employment compensation is only a privilege granted by the govern-
ment, and not a constitutional right, such privilege once extended
cannot be qualified in a manner which denies a constitutional right.2
The Court's holding was based entirely on the free exercise clause and
gave little weight to the argument concerning an establishment of
religion m pointing out that it was only insuring the neutrality of
government in areas of religious differences. 30 Nevertheless, Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurring, found two things wrong with the majority
opinion.31 He felt that the decision was inconsistent with the Court's
interpretation and application of the establishment clause, as most re-
cently expressed in the Bible reading cases.32 In addition, he could not
reconcile the decision with the Court's reasoning as to the free exercise
clause in the Sunday Closing Law cases. Mr. Justice Douglas, also
concurring, pointed out some requirements of various religious groups
and warned that decisions such as Braunfeld tend to trample these
religious views. He said that the result should be based on the
interference itself, regardless of the degree of harm involved. 3 The
dissenters felt that the instant decision of necessity overruled Braun-
feld, this being one basis for their dissent.3 4 They felt it was essentially
a matter for the state to make a legislative judgment as to whether
petitioner's case should be carved out as an exception.35
Certainly the importance of this decision lies in its interpretation of
the free exercise clause, as its result merely affirms the stand of most
27. ibid.
28. Id. at 404-05 & n.6. The footnote collects numerous cases supporting this proposi-
tion.
29. The establishment argument would be that since workers who for religious reasons
do not work on Sunday may not be denied benefits, S.C. CoD, § 64-4 (1952), this
prefers these persons and their religion over that of petitioner, whose religion is given
no such preference. On the troublesome problem of accommodation between the two
clauses, see KumLAND, RELIGION AND =HE LAw 112 (1962); Katz, Freedom of Religion
and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cmr. L. REv. 426 (1953).
30. Id. at 409. The Court distinguished Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 21, by
saying that it differed substantially in that the state offered a sufficient interest in
providing one uniform day of rest, Sunday, for all workers. 374 U.S. at 408. The Court
qualified its holding by concluding that it was only affirming the principle laid down
in the Everson case several years ago. Id. at 410.
31. 374 U.S. at 413.
32. "[T]he Establishment Clause as construed by this Court not only permits but
affirmatively requires South Carolina equally to deny the appellant's claim for unemploy-
ment compensation when her refusal to work on Saturdays is based upon her religious
creed." Id. at 415. Justice Stewart, dissenting in the Schempp case, stated that the Court,
in its application of the establishment clause, was mistakenly interpreting the clause as
representative of a philosophy of absolute separation of church from state, an idea
which he feels is too mechanistic. 374 U.S. at 309.
33. 374 U.S. at 411-12.
34. Id. at 421.
35. Id. at 423.
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states on the issue of unemployment benefits.36 The Court in inter-
preting the freedom of religion clause of the first amendment, while
recognizing its two parts, has had considerable difficulty in drawing a
clear line between them.37 The problem exists because state "recogni-
tion" of a religious scruple3 may be necessary to preserve an individ-
ual's right to the free exercise of that scruple, while, on the other hand,
to recognize such a scruple may result in an establishment of religion.
The instant case shows that a state's recognition of a scruple is neces-
sary whenever there is lacking any substantial secular reason for not so
recognizing it. In the absence of such a substantial secular interest,
an unreasonable and unconstitutional burden is placed on an individ-
ual's right to exercise his religious belief. The Court has decided that
there is not a sufficient secular reason for a state to deny unemploy-
ment benefits to the claimant, and since such denial places a burden
on the exercise of her scruple, it is unconstitutional. Conversely, the
state's establishment of a secular exercise, when such exercise appears
to be preferential toward some religion, is justifiable only when there
is a sufficient non-religious reason for the state's action. Since the
reading from certain religious books inevitably prefers some religions
over others, it will be an unconstitutional state practice in the absence
of a sufficient secular reason for so doing. The idea of preferential treat-
ment of one religion over another, which was not considered in the
opinion, could have been a basis for the Court to find in the instant
case that the petitioner was denied equal protection of the laws, since
the South Carolina code specifically protected one not accepting Sun-
day work for religious reasons.39 Although the recent decision in
Braunfeld v. Brown may be distinguished on the basis that in that
case there was an established state interest in providing a uniform day
of rest, as well as on-the basis that the resultant burden there was less
36. From one standpoint the Supreme Court cases dealing with religious freedom
are consistent, with the exception of the Braunfeld case and the other Sunday Closing
Law cases. This consistency is that the Court has steadfastly protected the religious
activities of minority groups. In this light Sherbert, Schempp, and Vitale may be re-
conciled and approved. The Court's attempt to justify Braunfeld on the basis of the
state's interest in providing one uniform day of rest is subject to criticism. The decisions
since BraunfeId may be an attempt by the Court to abandon the position taken there,
and to reinforce the position of religious minorities.
37. "Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two
quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Estab-
lishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not." Engel v. Vitale, supra note 14, at 430.
38. The term "recognition of a religious scruple" denotes making allowances for the
scruple within a frame of reference in which that scruple becomes relevant. For example,
in the instant case not making allowance for the scruple (non-availability for Saturday
work) was relevant in the frame of reference of the unemployment compensation law.
39. S.C. CODE § 64-4 (1952). See note 29 supra.
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direct than in the instant case, where claimant loses her total source
of income, the cases are substantially alike in dealing with the placing
of an economic burden on the exercise of a religious belief. The Court's
decision in Sherbert rightfully recognizes such economic burden and
raises the possibility that the Braunfeld case may be limited in the
future by the placing of a stronger emphasis on the burden imposed
on the religious practice and the requirement of a stronger balance in
favor of the secular interest sought to be promoted by the state.
Constitutional Law-Self Incrimination-Effect of a
Defendant's Comment on His Codefendant's Silence
Codefendants de Luna and Gomez were jointly tried in a federal
district court for violating federal narcotics laws.' De Luna did not
testify; Gomez did testify, asserting his innocence and de Luna's guilt.
Over de Luna's attorney's objection, Gomez's attorney emphasized de
Luna's silence to persuade the jury of Gomez's credibility and inno-
cence.2 The court instructed the jury that no inference of de Luna's
guilt could be drawn from his silence and that Gomez's testimony
should be scrutinized as that of any other witness. The jury acquitted
Gomez, but convicted de Luna. On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. In a
joint criminal trial in federal court when one codefendant testifies in
his own defense while another remains mute, the privilege against
self-incrimination prohibits any comment by the former on the latter's
silence. The court stated as dictum that a codefendant's right of con-
frontation3'gives him the right to comment on a defendant's failure to
1. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 174
(1958).
2. Gomez's attorney argued, "I want to tell you there is a difference between these
two men. We know a little something about Adolfo Gomez.- We -knew [sic] that for
fifteen or twenty years, more or less, he has worked day after day at hard labor. I
don't know wbat this man does for a living. He could have gotten up and told you."
308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis added by the court). The attorney also said, "He
[Gomez] has told you how the narcotics came into his possession, if it came into his
possession, as 'possession' is defined in the charge. That fleeting instant when it was
tossed to him and he tossed it out. I haven't heard any6ne deny that." Ibid. Later the
attorney argued, "Well, at least one man was honest enough and had courage enough
to take the stand and subject himself to cross examination, and tell you the whble
story, and tell you that, 'Yes, I first colored the story, but When I got back to my
senses I told the truth, and that's the whole thing.' You haven't heard a word from
this man [de Luna]." Ibid.
3. Judge Bell's concurring opinion implies that Judge Wisdom's opinion placed this
holding upon a defendant's right to a fair trial: "There is no authority whatever for
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testify;4 semble, separate trials must be ordered whenever one defend-
ant exercises his privilege not to testify and another defendant desires
to comment on this silence. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140
(5th Cir. 1962).
This case involved three important considerations: (1) a defendant's
right against self-incrimination, (2) one codefendant's right to com-
ment on another's failure to testify, whether this right is based on
the right of confrontation or the right to a fair trial, and (3) the
wisdom of and need for joint trials. Concerning the first, the fifth
amendment states: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." Not originating in the Constitu-
tion, this right began evolving in the thirteenth century in opposition
to the ex officio oath which was imposed by ecclesiastical courts to
discover violations of church law.5 Later it became a recognized part
of the common law as a protection from the inquisitorial methods of
the Court of the High Commission and the Court of the Star Chamber.6
Although at first" the right was a privilege against being interrogated
until accused, it was expanded to become the right to remain silent
about one's crimes.8 However, since an accused was incompetent as a
the proposition that Gomez would in any wise have been deprived of a fair trial if the
comments regarding the failure of de Luna to testify had not been made. He had no
right to go that far." Id. at 155 (concurring opinion). Yet, Judge Wisdom placed the
right on a more specific ground, stating that "his [Gomez's] right to confrontation al-
lows him to invoke every inference from de Luna's absence from the stand." Id. at 143.
4. The statement that a codefendant's right of confrontation allows him to comment
on a defendant's failure to testify can be considered dictum, provided that dictum
is defined as anything which is not absolutely necessary to sustain the judgement. How-
ever, in future cases this statement may be cited as authority or at least as persuasive
dictum since it can be considered an element of the rule stated in the case. For an
acute analysis of the problem of dicta, see Llewellyn, Remarks on The Theory of Ap-
pellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed,
3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950). See generally LI.ExELLYN, Tm CoMmoN LAw ' Thni-
TIoN: DECING APPFrA.s (1960).
5. For a succinct, thorough discussion of the historical development of this right, see
the discussion in the instant case, 308 F.2d 140 at 144-52. See generally ConwiN, TAE
CoNsa-rrtrroN OF THE UNrIEr STATEs, ANALYsis AND INTERPETATION 841-44 (1953).
6. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (pts.
1, 2), 29 MicH. L. Bxv. 1, 191 (1930); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 34 MwN. L. Rgv. 1 (1949).
7. The Latin maxim, nemo tenetur prodere seipsum (nobody is bound to accuse
himself), is referred to as the origin of the right. Wigmore states that the first person
to use these four words was Coke. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5
HAIIv. L. REv. 71, 84 (1891). In the same article, Wigmore also states: "The fact is
that the maxim nemo tenetur was an old and established one in ecclesiastical practice."
Id. at 83. However, Corwin refutes this assertion and shows that instead it was a
protest against that law. Corwin, supra note 6, at 3 n.3.
8. "Moreover, during all the period of agitation against the inquisitional oath of
the ecclesiastical courts, down to the time of Lilburn's case, it was the unchallenged
practice of the common law judges in criminal trials to question the accused and
bully him to admit his guilt. It is true, he was not under oath, for he was then in-
competent as a witness, but there was no thought that he could not be called on to
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witness for himself at common law and could not, therefore, be forced
to testify against himself, the precise ambit of a defendant's right was
academic. During this period in its development,9 the right was guar-
anteed to defendants by the Virginia Bill of Rights,10 and several early
state constitutions included similar provisions." Gradually, statutes re-
lieved defendants of their incompetency as witnesses. 2 These historical
developments form the bases for distinguishing between a defendant's
statutory option to testify in his own behalf and his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. 13 The constitutional right itself has been
subdivided into two parts: (1) any witness's right not to answer in-
criminating questions, and (2) a defendant's right not to be called as
a witness. 14 If a defendant waives his right not to testify, he assumes
the status of a regular witness and must respond to questions on cross-
examination.'5 But to protect defendant's self-incrimination privilege,
incriminate himself. By 1641, as an aftermath of Lilburn's case, defendants began to
claim, and judges to be persuaded, that an accused on trial was not to be compelled to
disclose his guilt. Here again by the early 1700s the revolution was complete ....
The ma.cim which once meant that no man shall be questioned until he has been first
accused comes to mean that no man shall ever be required to answer about his
crimes." McCoaucK, EVIDENCE § 120 (1954).
9. "In the American colonies the precedents are few, but it is highly probable that
for all practical purposes the privilege was pretty generally recognized prior to 1789,
though the varying language in the colonial constitutions leaves doubt as to the scope
of the protection which it afforded." MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 144-45
(1962).
10. Section 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, written in 1776, states: "'That
in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man bath a right to demand the cause and
nature of his accusation . . . nor can he be compelled to give evidence against him-
self."' (As quoted in Corwin, supra note 6, at 2.)
11. The constitutions of the following states prohibited self-incrimination in varied
phrases: Maryland (1776), Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1784), North
Carolina (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777), and Virginia (1776).
12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1958): "In trial of all persons charged with the
commission of offenses against the United States and in all proceedings in courts
martial and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the
person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make
such request shall not create any presumption against him." See generally Popper, His-
tory and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WAsH. U.L.Q. 454.
13. Recently, a criminal lawyer emphasized "the fundamental differences inherent
in the protective aspects of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and the statutory option embodied in Section 3481, Title 18, U.S.C." Friloux, Federal
Court's Charge on Defendant's Failure To Testify, 6 So. Tzx. L.J. 15 (1961).
14. Courts still recognize this distinction. In reversing a conviction for using the
mail to defraud, one court said: "The error made arises from confusing the privilege
of any witness not to give incriminating answers with the right of the accused not
to take the stand in a criminal proceding against him. Both come within the protection
of . . . the 5th Amendment ...... United States v. Housing Foundation of America,
Inc., 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949).
15. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). The Court there answered "no"
to the following certified question: "Was it error to require the defendant, Raffel,
offering himself as a witness upon the second trial, to disclose that he had not
testified as a witness in his own behalf upon the first trial." Id. at 496. "When he
[defendant] takes the stand, in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and
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to give him a genuine and free option, and to maintain the presump-
tion of innocence, the federal government and most states prohibit
comment on a defendant's refusal to testify. Some states,16 however,
do allow comment on the refusal, and the United States Supreme
Court has held that such comment in a state court does not violate
the fourteenth amendment. 1 Basically, proponents of the latter view
argue that an innocent defendant has nothing to hide and that the
protection is artificial since in daily activities laymen do infer guilt
from silence, a characteristic which certainly accompanies them, as
jurors, into the courtroom.18
As background for examining a codefendant's right to comment on
a non-testifying codefendant's silence, it is necessary to analyze the
right of confrontation 19 on which the court in the instant case based
within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined as to the facts in
issue." Id. at 497.
"The privilege of the defendant against self-incrimination and its corollary, the
prohibition against comment by counsel for the government upon his failure to testify,
have been jealously protected by the courts. But, when the defendant elects, voluntari-
ly, to testify, he waives his privilege . .. and makes comment upon his testimony
entirely proper." Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 646 (1938).
16. Six states allow comment on a defendant's refusal to testify. They are California,
Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, Ohio, and Vermont. 308 F.2d 140, 151 n.35. The
constitution of every state except New Jersey and Iowa affirms the right against self-
incrimination; both of those states recognize the right by statute and by common law.
In fact, the due process clause of the Iowa constitution has been held to include this
right. Morgan, supra note 6, at 1-23. See generally Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of
Accused to Testify, 31 MicH. L. REv. 40 (1932).
17. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (5-4 decision). California's con-
stitution and statutes allow both the court and counsel to comment on a defendant's
failure "to explain or to deny" evidence or facts against him, regardless of whether
he testified. Affirming defendant's conviction of first degree murder, the Court held that
the self-incrimination privilege is not inherent in either a fair trial or due process.
18. "In support it is asked why the jury should not take the silence into account.
In daily life we should most certainly do so. In any event, how can we in fact pre-
vent the jury from doing so? The only real effect of the prohibition on comment is
that in the excitement of the concluding argument the prosecuting attorney may, per-
haps inadvertently, make a remark which is of no practical significance but which
will be seized on as grounds for reversal by a higher court." PtTrrKANMME, ADMINISTUA-
TION OF CRnmNAL LAW 196 (1953).
In proposing reforms in criminal procedure, Mr. Hiscock argues for the adoption of
this view. "But at least the repeal of this provision [which prohibits comments on de-
fendant's failure to testify] would cure what is frequently a species of legal hypocrisy,
whereby courts and jurors are compelled to assume an appearance of disregarding and
forgetting something which it is practically impossible for either of them to disregard
or forget and it would also remove the danger, by no means an inconsequential one,
that a conscientious district attorney in the heat of a trial may, with honest inadvertence,
say something which may be regarded as an intrusion into this prohibited field of
comment and thereby furnish a claim for reversal." Hiscock, Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure in New York, 26 CoLUM. L. REv. 253, 259 (1926).
19. For a terse discussion on the use of legal history, see Orfield, Early Federal
Criminal Procedure, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 503, 533-34 (1961).
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this right to comiient.20 "[T]o be confronted with witnesses against
hini" is'a defendant's right guaranteed by the sixth amendment. An
integral element of a fair trial, this right of confrontation evolved at
common law concurrently with the development of the accusatorial
system.2 1 Essentially, the purpose was to prevent the use of ex parte
affidavits which denied the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine
and to have the jury observe witnesses' demeanor in order to properly
evaluate the credibility of their testimony.12 In 1926 the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the constitutional guarantee
merely preserved that common law right and did not expand it.23
However, this does not mean that the Court has not been diligent in
protecting criminal defendants' rights. Since other concepts, such as
due process and fair trial, have been expanded to meet new situations,2
perhaps neither need nor reason has been presented to base new hold-
20. "Gomez [the testifying co-defendant] has rights as well as de Luna [the mute
defendant], and they should be no less than if he were prosecuted singly. His right to
confrontation allows him to invoke every inference from de Luna's [the mute de-
fendant's] absence from the stand." 308 F.2d at 143.
21. See generally CoRwn, op. cit supra note 5, at 844.
22. "The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases,
being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination
of the witness in which the accused has .an opportunity, not only of testing the recol-
lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy
of belief." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
23. "The right of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth
Amendment, but was a common-law right having recognized exceptions. The purpose
of that provision, this Court often has said, is to continue and preserve that right, and
not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions." Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542,
548 (1926). As examples of this position, the Court has stated that the admission in
evidence of a witness's testimony at a former trial of the defendant does not abridge
defendant's right, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878); that dying
declarations are not precluded by the sixth amendment, Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47 (1899); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (habeas corpus proceed-
ing); that the sixth amendment does not give a defendant the right to the names of
grand jury witnesses, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); that if witnesses
are dead the stenographic report of their testimony at defendant's former trial is ad-
missible, Mattox v. United States, supra; that if a witness's absence is due to the
prosecutor's negligence the testimony given in a preliminary hearing cannot be
introduced, Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); and that letters which were
answered by defendant were admissible although the correspondent was not a witness,
Salinger v. United States, supra. These decisions demonstrate the Court's tendency to
preserve the right of confrontation without expanding it to meet new situations.
24. Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959), where the judgment of
conviction was reversed for the court's denial of defendant's motion for severance which
resulted in his being denied the right of confrontation. The court also said that "over
the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court, followed by lower federal courts, has
employed a developing use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
a means of asserting a sort of supervisory jurisdiction to assure fundamental fairness
in state criminal proceedings." Id. at 898 n.6.
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ings on the vital, but relatively inert, right of confrontation.2 From
this background there seems to be little support for the proposition that
the right of confrontation gives one codefendant the right to comment
on another's silence.
That joint trials2 aid in the efficient administration of criminal
justice has not seriously been questioned.2 7 However, it is basic that
procedure is merely a means to an end-justice-and that only when
a fair trial is assured should other factors influence procedure.2
Historically, joint trials were accepted at common law, and this tradi-
tion is followed in courts of the United States.29 Although some states
by statute currently give defendants an absolute right to separate
trials,30 in federal courts defendants do not have this right.31 Granting
25. Recently, lower federal courts have held the following in criminal cases: (1)
The judge's description, without defendant's or his counsel's presence, of physical sur-
roundings to a jury viewing scenes affecting alleged narcotic dealings was not pre-
judicial. Shannon v. United States, 263 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1959). (2) Codefendant's
written confession which also accused defendant of acting with him in the alleged
offenses deprived defendant of his right of confrontation since defendant had no op-
portunity to cross-examine the codefendant and since the jury could not carry out the
instruction not to treat the statement as evidence against defendant. Barton v. United
States, supra. (3) Admitting in evidence against one tried for fraudulently rep-
resenting himself as a personal envoy of the President an authenticated affidavit of a
White House personnel official that no record had been found of defendant's employ-
ment was not a denial of defendant's right of confrontation. T'Kach v. United States,
242 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1957). (4) Not allowing defendant to examine suppressed
original records of wire tapping of defendant's phone was a violation of his rights
where the court based its findings on its reading of these records in chambers. United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). (5) The prosecutor's procedure of in-
troducing evidence against a particular defendant in a joint trial for conspiracy and
of later moving, as he had reserved the right to do, to admit this evidence against the
other eight defendants did not violate defendants' right of confrontation. Bridgman v.
United States, 183 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1950). (6) No deposition can be read against
defendant. United States v. Haderlein, 118 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1953). See also
Young v. United States, 214 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
26. "Joint trials" can mean either a joinder of defendants, a joinder of offenses, or
both. In this discussion, however, the term is restricted to mean a joinder of de-
fendants.
27. Orfield, supra note 20.
28. Mr. Justice Brandeis eloquently noted the purpose of criminal procedure. "[I]n
the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large
factor. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means
which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play." Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Whether or not to grant separate trials "is a matter of discretion in the court,
and not of right in the parties." United States v. Marchant, Z5 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 305
(1827). Note that the defendants were joined without question and that the question
of whether to grant separate trials arose later. See also United States v. Bayaud, 16 Fed.
376 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
30. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 631.03 (1945); W. VA. CODE ANN. , 6197 (1961)
(applied in State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 120 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1961), 64 W. VA.
L. REv. 110 (1961)).
31. "Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information
if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
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separate trials is plainly within the discretion of the federal trial
judge.1 The requirement of a separate trial for each defendant, especi-
ally in large conspiracy trials,s would increase the burdens of federal
courts whose dockets already are crowded, and would present numer-
ous other problems.
34
In the instant case the court in an opinion by Judge Wisdom pre-
sents a well documented historical analysis of the right against self-
incrimination. Interpreting this development in the common law tradi-
tion of continuously improving legal concepts to fit the times,35 the
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may
be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need
not be charged in each count." FED. R. Crmf. P. 8(b).
"The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried
together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have been
joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the
prosecution were under such single indictment or information;" FED. R. CanR. P. 13.
"If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance
of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires." FED. R. CaRM. P. 14.
In the "Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules" it is stated: "This rule is a restatement
of existing law under which severance and other similar relief is entirely in the discretion
of the court. . . ." (Emphasis added.) For a good judicial discussion of these rules, see
Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959).
32. "It is provided in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a trial by an
impartial jury. That it was within the discretion of the court to order the defendants to
be tried together there can be no question, and the practise [sic] is too well established
to require further consideration." Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585 (1919).
Defendant "was not entitled to a separate trial as a matter of right. His motion for
a severance was addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and no abuse of discretion
is shown." Guon v. United States, 285 F.2d 140, 142-43 (8th Cir. 1960).
"Ordinarily the granting of such motions is within the discretion of the trial court and,
where the charge against all the defendants may be proved by the same evidence and
results from the same series of acts as was the case here, the discretion should not be
interfered with." United States v. Cohen, 124 F.2d 164, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1941).
33. See, e.g., Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939) (eighty-eight defendants
jointly tried); United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1959) (nineteen de-
fendants jointly tried).
34. In addition, witnesses may become tired of the repetitious procedure; they would
waste hours; they might be intimidated to prevent their testimony; the cost of the
extra trials would burden taxpayers; the administrative problems, such as obtaining
new panels of jurors, would be multiplied; and the case would eventually become stale.
Hiscock, supra note 19, at 257. All of these problems would become so serious, especi-
ally during the trials of fifty or more alleged conspirators, that one wonders just how
fair the trials would be toward the end. Analogous factors also would penalize defend-
ants whose trials were unduly postponed. Consider, for example, defendants who would
lose favorable witnesses from death, or, more frequently, from lapse of memory; de-
fendants who would be pre-judged as guilty by society because their indictment was
pending so long and who consequently would suffer a loss of reputation; and defendants
who could not obtain bail (either because they could not secure the requisite bond or
because they were held without bail) and consequently who must suffer prolonged
pre-trial incarceration. These are indicative of the problems which would arise if joint
trials were abolished.
35. As Professor Llewellyn phrased it: "There is a Duty to Account honestly to the
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court concluded that the effect of comment upon a defendant's silence
is detrimental, regardless of whether the judge, the prosecutor, or a
codefendant's counsel makes the comment.36 Although the prosecutor
argued that the fifth amendment applies only to the federal govern-
ment and not to private citizens (such as defense attorneys), the court
emphasized that this trial was in a federal court under the sanctions
of federal law, procedure, and practice, and that the judge's instruc-
tions to the jury were insufficient to remove the prejudicial effect of
any comment upon the defendant's silence. Consequently, the defend-
ant's right against self-incrimination was abridged. Incidental to its re-
versal, the court also stated that it would protect the codefendant's
right, based on confrontation, to make such comment,37 but supported
this statement with no authority. This position3 was strenuously criti-
cized by Judge Bell in his concurring opinion,39 which emphasized
the importance of joint trials, but which did not analyze fully the
precise scope of a defendant's rights to a fair trial and to confronta-
tion in relation to his commenting on a codefendant's silence.
That a defendant's right against self-incrimination is abridged by a
codefendant's comment on his silence seems clear after analyzing the
nature of that right. However, it is difficult to accept the proposition
that the sixth amendment right to confrontation gives one defendant
the right to comment on another defendant's silence and by doing
so to abridge the latter's right against self-incrimination.40 If one ac-
authorities." LLmvm.LYN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 389.
36. "Indeed, the effect on the jury of comment by a co-defendant's attorney might
be more harmful than if it comes from judge or prosecutor." 308 F.2d at 152.
37. "The ruling that counsel for appellant [defendant] had a legal right to comment
on the failure of his co-defendant to take the stand is one of first impression upon
which neither the appellant nor appellee took a position in their respective briefs." Peti-
tion for Rehearing, p. 2, de Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
38. See note 3 supra.
39. 308 F.2d at 155 (Bell, J., concurring specially).
40. Although the point was not in issue and was not argued in the instant case, a
testifying codefendant could make the following argument to demonstrate that disallow-
ing his comment on the other codefendant's silence would abridge his constitutional
rights. The sixth amendment to the Constitution grants every defendant the right "to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor," a right which is imple-
mented by federal statute. Fm). R. Cn m. P. 17. If separate trials were granted, one
codefendant could require the other to take the stand at the former's trial, although
that other could refuse to answer any specific question by relying on his right against
self-incrimination. (See State v. Gambino, 221 La. 1039, 61 So. 2d 732 (1952), which
is noted in the instant case, 308 F.2d at 153. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
a defendant could force another person jointly charged with him in the same information
for the same offense, but not on trial with him, to testify over that other person's objec-
tion. On the stand that other person could refuse to answer any question which re-
quired an incriminating answer, and therefore his right against self-incrimination would
not be infringed.) When the other defendant as a mere witness at codefendant's trial,
did refuse to answer questions, codefendant could emphasize this refusal to persuade
the jury of his innocence. Therefore, codefendant's rights were abridged by disallow-
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cepted this proposition, he could argue by analogy that the sixth
amendment right to compel witnesses to testify in his favor includes
the right to compel a codefendant to testify-a result which has been
uniformly rejected.41 Instead of depending on such technical argu-
ments, however, the alternative positions should be weighed qualita-
tively with reference to what effect each would have on the three
considerations-a defendant's right against self-incrimination, one co-
defendant's right to comment on another's refusal to take the stand,
and the administrative advantages of joint trials-and to base the con-
clusion on the grounds of this evaluation. To avoid error, it is necessary
to restrict one of these factors under facts similar to the instant case.42
Of course, if before trial the judge knew that one defendant would
testify and another would not and that their defenses conflicted, he
should order separate trials,43 thus protecting the rights of both de-
fendants and avoiding at the joint trial the dilemma of whether to
allow one codefendant to comment on the other's silence. However, the
holding of the court presents complex problems in numerous situations.
Consider the cases in which two defendants, in order to obtain sepa-
rate trials, tell their attorneys and the judge that one will testify and
the other will not; or the cases in which two defendants might conceal
this fact in order to use the unavoidable error effect of their joint
trial. Affecting professional ethics and their enforcement among mem-
bers of the bar, the holding of the court also creates problems in cases
where attorneys might use the holding either to effect error intention-
ally or for automatic severance, and especially in cases where the de-
fendant who honestly had planned not to testify changes his mind
after the prosecution had rested its case. These are examples of pos-
sible practical problems which may arise under the court's holding.
Although there may be no satisfactory solution under the holding of
ing such comment at a joint trial, since a joint trial should not diminish a criminal
defendant's rights. Also this basic argument supports a motion for severance under
the particular facts of the instant case and demonstrates that the refusal to grant
separate trials was an abuse of the trial court's discretion, which would seem to be a
sound basis on which to protect the rights of the testifying codefendant. See Barton v.
United States, supra note 25.
41. See notes 5-19 supra and accompanying text.
42. Given a joint trial where one codefendant starts to comment on the other's silence,
as in the instant case, the trial judge must either allow such comment or not allow such
comment. If he allows such comment, the mute defendant's right against self-incrimina-
tion is infringed. If he does not allow such comment, the codefendant's right of con-
frontation is infringed. Therefore, the rights of at least one defendant will be infringed
in the joint trial and he will obtain a reversal of any conviction in that trial. In short,
it is not possible to have a joint trial and also to protect fully the rights of both de-
fendants as indicated in the holding.
43. Even in separate trials, there may be a problem of the order of these trials. This
problem, however, is not as serious as the dilemma presented by a joint trial. See
generally Sullivan, A Comparative Survey of Problems in Criminal Procedure, 6 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 380 (1961).
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this case, abolishing all joint trials is certainly not one.4 After weigh-
ing these practical problems with the three elements discussed above,
it seems that the court should have limited its holding by stating that
one codefendant has no right to comment on another's refusal to take
the stand. If the precise issue of a defendant's right to comment on a
codefendant's silence were argued, the court, emphasizing the inherent
conflict between each defendant's rights in a joint trial and the court's
duty to protect both, could grant separate trials on the ground that
not to do so would be an abuse of discretion, and not on the ground
that one codefendant has a right to comment on another's refusal to
take the stand.
Labor Law-Ability of Individual Employee To Bring
Suit Under Section 301 of Taft-Hartley Act
Plaintiff employee, individually and as assignee of employees
similarly situated, sued in a state court for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement with the union to which plaintiff belonged. The
complaint alleged that the defendant employer refused to allow plain-
tiff to report for regular work during a strike called by a second union,
while employees not covered by any collective bargaining agreement
were permitted to report to work and were paid full wages even
though there was no work available. This, plaintiff alleged, violated
the collective bargaining agreement which provided that "there shall
be no discrimination against any employee because of his membership
or activity in the guild."' The trial court sustained defendants' motion
to dismiss on the grounds that if the employer's violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement were proven, an unfair labor practice would
have been made out, and hence the subject matter was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The
44. To abolish joint trials is not the best solution, although this currently is being
done by a district judge. "[DIetermination of the issue [of whether codefendant can
comment] may not be essential to the case and the consequences of the ruling can be
far reaching, it having already had a significant effect on joint trials in the Western
District of Texas in that ioint trials have been and are now automatically severed and
not permitted within the San Antonio, Austin and Waco Divisions." Petition for Rehear-
ing, p. 2, de Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
See text accompanying notes 27-37 supra, demonstrating that this penalizes defendants
by causing them loss of witnesses, loss of reputation, prolonged incarceration, etc.
1. Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.2 On certiorari3 in the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, reversed. An individual employee
may sue for damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement
within the scope of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act even though the facts alleged would also constitute an unfair labor
practice within the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
One of the earliest interpretations of section 301 of the LMRA was
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.4 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in that case denied federal court jurisdic-
tion over a union's suit to enforce wage claims due individual em-
ployees. His opinion was bottomed on two premises: (1) that section
301 of the LMRA did not result in the creation of a body of federal
substantive rights derived from collective bargaining agreements; and
(2) that an employee's personal or individual claims, as opposed to
union or management claims, under such agreements were in any
event not cognizable under that section. The first of these premises
was shortly overturned by the Court in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills.5 Beginning with Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court em-
barked upon the process of fashioning a body of federal common law
for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements subject to
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.6 Under this federal common law,
it is now clear that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
federal courts in suits arising under section 301,7 and that the substan-
2. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1962). "Plaintiff
may not characterize an act which constitutes an unfair labor practice as a contract
violation and thereby circumvent the plain mandate of Congress-that jurisdiction of
such matters be vested in the national labor relations board and that Federal and
State trial courts are without jurisdiction to redress by injunction or otherwise unfair
labor practices." Id. at 364-65, 106 N.W.2d at 793.
3. 369 U.S. 827 (1962).
4. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
5. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court in Lincoln Mills stated that "the substantive
law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from
the policy of our national labor laws. . . .The Labor Management Relations Act
expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statu-
tory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking
at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy.
The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem."
Id. at 456-57. See also Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under
Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956).
6. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
7. Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). "On its face § 30 1(a) simply
gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits for violation of certain specified
types of contracts. The statute does not state nor even suggest that such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive. It provides that suits of the kind described 'may' be brought in the
federal district courts, not that they must be. . . .Concurrent jurisdiction has been a
common phenomenon in our judical history, and exclusive federal court jurisdiction over
cases arising under federal law has been the exception rather than the rule.... To hold
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tive law which is to be applied in either the state court8 or the federal
court9 is federal law. The jurisdiction of the courts to handle a suit
arising under section 301 is not preempted by the fact that the subject
matter of the suit is also an unfair labor practice which is within the
competence of the National Labor Relations Board. 10 Even though the
labor-management agreement may not be a collective bargaining con-
that § 301(a) operates to deprive the state courts of a substantial segment of their
established jurisdiction over contract actions would thus be to disregard this consistent
history of hospitable acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction. . . . The legislative history
makes clear that the basic purpose of § 301(a) was not to limit, but to expand, the
availability of forums for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organizations.
Moreover, there is explicit evidence that Congress expressly intended not to encroach
upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts." Id. at 506-09. See also Feldesman,
Section 301 and the National Labor Relations Act, 30 TN. L. Rav. 16, 17 (1962);
Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. Ry. 1199 (1962).
8. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The Court
found that the Washington court had erroneously applied state law to reach their result.
However, as the same result would be reached under federal law the Supreme Court
affirmed the Washington court's decision. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart
reasoned that "The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive prin-
ciples of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.
Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated
under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered
by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy. More im-
portant, the subject matter of § 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.' ...
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
state and federal laws would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be
certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an
agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to
formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under
two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the con-
tract." Id. at 103. See Feldesman, supra note 6, at 18; Sovern, Section 301 and the
Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAnv. L. Rv. 529, 534 (1963).
9. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See note 5 supra.
10. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). "Since this
was a suit for violation of a collective bargaining contract within the purview of § 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the pre-emptive doctrine of cases such
as San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, based upon the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant. . . . As
pointed out in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S., at 513, Congress 'de-
liberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements "to the usual proces-
ses of law."'... It is, of course, true that conduct which is a violation of a contractual
obligation may also be conduct constituting an unfair labor practice, and what has been
said is not to imply that enforcement by a court of a contract obligation affects the
jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B. to remedy unfair labor practices, as such." Id. at 101 n.9.
See also Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdiction of the
NLRB, 57 CoLum. L. RPv. (1957); Feldesman, supra note 7; Severn, supra note 8.
In the Smith case the alleged conduct of the employer was "not only arguably, but
concededly . . . an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board." Mr. Justice White stated that "the authority of the Board to deal
with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not
displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the
courts in suits under § 301." 371 U.S. at 197. For additional commentary on the
preemption aspect of the Smith case see Kovarsky, Unfair Labor Practices, Individual
Rights and Section 301, 16 VAND. L. Ray. 595, 609 (1963); Severn, supra note 8.
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tract and may not grant the union exclusive recognition, it is still
cognizable in suits under section 301.11 Where the collective bargain-
ing agreement provides that a dispute shall be settled exclusively and
finally by compulsory arbitration, the courts in section 301 suits will
imply a no-strike agreement. 12 The various remedies which have been
sought for the breach of a no-strike clause include suits for damages
for breach of contract, arbitration, and injunctive relief. The courts
have held that whether the relief should be couched in terms of an
award of damages or whether arbitration is the proper remedy is a
question which must be decided by the terms of the contract entered
into by the parties.13 However, the Court has decided that federal
11. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). Contracts
as envisioned by § 301(a) are not limited to collective bargaining contracts concerning
wages, hours, and conditions of employment which have been concluded as a direct
result of the bargaining processes between employers and unions which are exclusive
representatives of the employees. "Had Congress contemplated a restrictive differentia-
tion, we may assume that it would not have eschewed 'collective bargaining contracts'
unwittingly." Id. at 25.
Mr. Justice Brennan stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether or not the
strike settlement agreement was a collective bargaining agreement. "It is enough that
this is clearly an agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to
the maintenance of labor peace between them." Id. at 28. See also Feldesman,
supra note 7; Sovern, supra note 8.
12. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). "The
collective bargaining contract expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of sub-
mitting the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration. . . . [T]he Courts of
Appeals of at least five Federal Circuits have held that a strike to settle a dispute which
a collective bargaining agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by
compulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of the agreement. The National Labor
Relations Board has reached the same conclusion .... We approve that doctrine ...
[A] contrary view would be completely at odds with the basic policy of national labor
legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare." Id. at
105. (Footnotes omitted.) See Isaacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration and the
No-Strike Clause, 48 A.B.A.J. 914, 916 (1962).
13. Whether an employer's claim for damages for an alleged breach of a no-strike
clause is an arbitrable matter "is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of
the contract entered into by the parties:' Atdnson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241
(1962). Where the grievance and arbitration provisions provide only for the sub-
mission of grievances by the union and arbitration "may be invoked only at the option
of the union" the employer's suit for damages will not be stayed pending arbitration.
Id. at 243. However, where the arbitration provisions cover "all complaints, disputes or
grievances between them [the parties] involving . . . any act or conduct or relation
between the parties" the claimed violation of the no-strike agreement presents an
arbitrable issue requiring the issuance of a stay. Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50,
American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 257 n.2 (1962).
In the Steelworkers trilogy the Court stated the relationship which was to be
accorded between the courts and the arbitration processes:
"The function of the Court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit
all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed
by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not
be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it
connotes that was bargained for. . . . The courts, therefore, have no business weighing
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courts cannot grant injunctive relief in section 301 suits for breach of
a no-strike agreement. 14  When the union has been held liable for
damages in a suit under section 301 for breach of the no-strike clause,
these damages are not assessable against the officers or members,'5
These principles form the basic structure of the federal common law
which, according to the first premise in Westinghouse, need not be
created. The second premise in Westinghouse, relating to the individ-
ual claims under the collective bargaining contract, has been the sub-
ject of considerable litigation, and its scope and meaning is as yet
unclear.16
the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim,
or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument vhich
will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not
merely those which the court will deem meritorious." United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960). (Footnotes omitted.)
"The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties.
It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.... The collective agreement covers the whole
employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a
particular industry or of a particular plant." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960). (Footnotes omitted.) "[T]he parties' objec-
tive in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of unin-
terrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement serve their specialized
needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and com-
petence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed." Id. at 582.
In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the
Court pointed out that "plenary review by a court of the merits would make meaningless
the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would almost never
be final. . . . [T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained
for; and so far as the arbitrator's decisions concerns construction of the contract, the
courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is
different from his." Id. at 599.
For extensive treatment of the Steelworkers trilogy see NAnoNAL ACADEMY OF
ARarmATons, AaBrrPiAnoN AND PuBrac PoracY 8-82 (1961); Aaron, Arbitration in the
Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 360 (1962); Gregory,
Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REv. 888 (1962);
Kovarsky, Comment: The Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate, 14 VAND. L. REv.
1105 (1960); Smith, The Question of "Arbitrability"-The Roles of the Arbitrator, the
Court, and the Parties, 16 Sw. L.J. 1 (1962); Wellington, Judical Review and the
Promise To Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962).
14. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). "§ 301 was not intended
to have any such partially repealing effect upon such a long-standing, carefully thought
out and highly significant part of this country's labor legislation as the Norris-LaGuardia
Act." 370 U.S. at 203. (Footnotes omitted.) "[W]hat is involved is the question of
whether the employer is to be allowed to enjoy the benefits of an injunction along with
the right which Congress gave him in § 301 to sue for breach of a collective agree-
ment. . . . Congress was not willing to insure that enjoyment to an employer at the
cost of putting the federal courts back into the business of enjoining strikes." Id. at
214. For a case comment on the Sinclair case see 16 VAND. L. REv. 245 (1963).
15. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). "The national labor policy
requires and we hold that when a union is liable for damages for violation of the
no-strike clause, its officers and members are not liable for these damages." Id. at 249.
16. Local Lodge 2040, I.A.M. v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959); Copra
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In the instant case the Court noted the fact that in Westinghouse17
a majority had concluded that section 301 did not cover suits brought
by a union to enforce employee rights which are "peculiar in the in-
dividual" and "uniquely personal," and which arise from the separate
employment contract between the employer and the individual 8 Mr.
Justice White speaking for the Court stated that "subsequent decisions
... have removed the underpinnings of Westinghouse and its holding
is no longer authoritative as a precedent."19 Noting that Lincoln Mills
had settled the fact that section 301 had substantive content, the
opinion pointed out numerous applications of the enforcement of
"individual rights" in section 301 suits.20 Reasoning that individual
claims lie at the heart of grievance and arbitration machinery, and are
inevitably so intertwined with union interest that they cannot be
separated, the Court stated that the only way to effectuate a uniform
body of substantive labor law was to allow the unions to enforce
these rights. Likewise the Court reasoned that the same policy con-
siderations led to the conclusion that individual employees should be
able to sue under section 301.21 The Court summarily dismissed de-
fendant's contention that in section 301 the word "between" refers to
"suits" and not to "contracts," i.e., that only suits between employers
v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956) ("§ 301(a) gives jurisdiction only where the
suit as well as the contract is between an employer and a labor organization." 236
F.2d at 113); Dimeco v. Fisher, 185 F. Supp. 213 (D.N.J. 1960) ("Not only is there
grave doubt whether an individual employee may bring suit under § 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, but there is even graver doubt that such uniquely personal suits as
these for wrongful discharge are cognizable under § 301(a)." 185 F. Supp. at 215).
See also Sanders & Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1959 Ten-
nessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REv. 1231, 1240-44 (1959).
17. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
18. "There was no suggestion that Congress, at a time when its attention was di-
rected to congestion in the federal courts, particularly in the heavy industrial areas,
intended to open the doors of the federal courts to a potential flood of grievances
based upon an employer's failure to comply with terms of a collective agreement
relating to compensation, terms peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject
matter and which, when violated, give a cause of action to the individual employee."
Id. at 460.
19. 371 U.S. at 199.
20. "Section 301 has been applied to suits to compel arbitration of such individual
grievances as rates of pay, hours of work and wrongful discharge, Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, supra; General Electric Co. v. Local 205, UEW, 353 U.S. 547; to obtain
specific enforcement of an arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement and back pay to
individual employees, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593; to recover wage increases in a contest over the validity of the collective bargaining
contract, Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra; and to suits against individual union mem-
bers for violation of a no-strike clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra." Id. at 199-200.
21. Id. at 200.
22. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
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and unions are Within the purview of section 301-stating that neither
the language nor the legislative history of section 301 required such a
restrictive interpretation.P To leave these individual claims to be
governed by state law would thus thwart the congressional policy of
uniformity.2 4
The instant decision reflects the importance the Court attaches to
the achievement of uniformity in the body of law relating to the
enforcement of rights under collective agreements within the scope of
section 301.5 All such rights, no matter by whom asserted and no
matter in which tribunal, arise under the same body of federal law.
While this case appears to have eliminated for the federal courts the
problem created by the Westinghouse decision-what are the "pecu-
liarly individual" rights that could not be enforced in section 301 suits
-many problems still remain. The Court has decided that such "indi-
vidual" rights as rates of pay, hours of work, and wrongful discharge
are enforceable in union suits to compel arbitration under section
301.26 In the instant case the Court has gone a step further by holding
that a claim of damages for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment may now be asserted under section 301 by an individual em-
ployee.27 This case suggests a partial solution to the problem of en-
forcing individual rights, but gives little guidance for the solution of
the many procedural problems that may accompany suits for the
enforcement of such rights. As was pointed out by both the majority2
and the dissent2 9 the question remains open as to what rights an
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
23. 371 U.S. at 200.
24. Id. at 200-01.
25. See note 16 supra. See also Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements
Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 194 (1956); Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFFALo L. Rv. 239
(1960); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 362, 372 (1962); Note, 41 CoanELL L.Q. 320 (1956).
26. See note 20 supra.
27. The Court in a per curiam opinion in General Drivers, Local 89 v. Riss & Co.,
372 U.S. 517 (1963), overruled Westinghouse on its facts.
28. "The only part of the collective bargaining contract set out in this record is the
no-discrimination clause. Respondent does not argue here and we need not consider
the question of federal law of whether petitioner, under this contract, has standing to
sue for breach of the no-discrimination clause nor do we deal with the standing of other
employees to sue upon other clauses in other contracts." 371 U.S. at 201 n.9.
29. "[Tlhe Court studiously refrains from saying when, for what kinds of breach, or
under what circumstances an individual employee can bring a § 301 action and when
he must step aside for the union to prosecute his claim. Nor does the Court decide
whether the suit brought in this case is one of the types which an individual can
bring.... It seems to me to be at least a slight deviation from the Court's normal
practice to determine the law that would be applicable in a particular lawsuit while
leaving open the question of whether such a lawsuit has even been brought in the
particular case the court is deciding.... [S]ince the Court is deciding that this type
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individual employee has standing to enforce in a section 301 suit. The
fights which the Court indicates are enforceable by employees are
those which are "inevitably intertwined" with union interests and those
which raise "grave question concerning the interpretation and en-
forceability" of the collective agreement.30 In allowing the individual
employees to sue under section 301 in the instant case the Court has
indicated that the individual rights question with which they are now
concerned is not whether all such rights are subject to section 301
(they are), but rather which of these rights may be enforced by the
individual employee. The impact of the Smith case may in the long
run have raised more questions than it has answered: (1) Are there
rights which even though relating to individual claims are so "inevi-
tably intertwined" with union interests as still to be enforceable only
by the union or in a suit in which the union is a necessary party? (2)
Are suits by individual employees limited only to the enforcement of
rights other than those in which the union has a direct interest? (3)
If so, is the "uniquely personal" distinction discussed in Westinghouse
brought forward in the "peculiarly individuar' rights mentioned in the
instant case, so that Westinghouse would still have some limited
vitality? (4) Is the enlargement of the scope of section 301 so as to
include suits in court by individual employees contrary to the general
policy of the Court in fostering an internal method of settling collec-
tive bargaining disputes through arbitration? (5) Will allowing em-
ployees to sue impair effective bargaining by the union, since an em-
ployer will be more reluctant to negotiate with the union to settle a
claim when he may nevertheless be subject to a later suit on the same
claim by an employee? However limited the instant decision may be
or however many the problems which it presents, 31 it is still a welcome
of action can be brought to vindicate workers' rights, I think it should also decide
clearly and unequivocally whether an employee injured by the discrimination of either
his employer or his union can file and prosecute his own lawsuit in his own way." Id.
at 204-05 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 371 U.S. at 200.
31. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his decision in Westinghouse gave as one of his
reasons for deciding that employees could not sue under § 301 that the employee
always had recourse to state courts to enforce his individual rights. 348 U.S. at 437.
This is now a fact, at least in § 301 suits under the instant decision.
For a good treatment of the conflicting viewpoints on employee suits in state courts
see Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 362, 363-70 (1962).
For a collection of cases illustrating the individual employee's difculty in enforcing
collective bargaining agreements against his employer see Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 382
(1951).
For discussions of employee rights under collective agreements see generally Blumrosen,
Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Em-
ployee Autonomy, 13 RuTGERus L. REv. 631 (1959); Comm. on Improvements of
Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, Report, in ABA SEcTION OF LABOR RE-
LATIONS LAW, PaocINmms 33 (1954), reprinted at 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1955); Cox,
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relief for the individual employee, for now he at least has a forum in
which to bring his suit.
Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAIIv. L. REv. 601 (1956); Hanslowe, Individual
Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Consqur L.Q. 25 (1959); Howlett, Contract
Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316 (1957);
Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analyss, 9
BUFrALO L. Rnv. 239 (1960); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements
and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. BEv. 362 (1962).
